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SOME CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON SAFEGUARDS IN THE 
CASE OF DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY IN HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE 
SETTINGS 
WALTER BOENTE* 
This article highlights perspectives and regulations on safeguards in the case of 
deprivation of liberty of some continental European countries – namely Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Austria, and Spain. It illustrates the continent’s disparate 
approaches to the subject, both those founded in history and in the different legal 
traditions.1  
Continental legislation struggles to cope with the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. The most recent observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities in Germany, in May 2015, recommend for example, 
that Germany “amend legislation to prohibit involuntary placement and promote 
alternative measures”.2 Nevertheless, legislation and practice in these countries might 
provide some different points of view on deprivation of liberty safeguards.  
I. GERMANY 
German law reflects the historically common structure of legislation concerning 
deprivation of liberty in health and social care settings on the continent. Provisions 
concerning deprivation of liberty grew on two grounds. On the one hand, regulation in 
private law, and thereby the promotion of the interest of the individual, led to provisions 
concerning deprivation of liberty in the health interests of the person concerned. On 
the other hand, regulation in public law, in particular administrative or rather public 
security law, led to provisions allowing deprivation of liberty to avert danger to life, 
health, or even “society”; in other words, for the protection of both the interests of 
individuals as well as the public. Because of these different legal approaches, one and 
the same interest could be “promoted” or “protected” by different provisions.3 
                                            
* Centre of Comparative, European and International Law, University of Lausanne. We thank Devrim 
Baki and Euan Elia Hindle for their generous support in the preparation of this article. 
1 For a comparison between the UK and for example Germany in this field, see H.R. Röttgers and P. 
Lepping, ‘Treatment of the mentally ill in the Federal Republic of Germany: Sectioning practice, legal 
framework, medical practice and key differences between Germany and the UK’, The Psychiatrist 23 
(1999), pp. 601 et seq, even if outdated as a result of legislative developments. 
2 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations on the initial report of 
Germany, N 29 ff.; see also CPRD, Concluding observations on the initial report of Spain, N 35 f.; 
CRPD, Concluding observations on the initial report of Austria, N 30 ff.; full texts available at 
<http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=4&DocTy
peID=5> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
3 For (partially outdated) country reports on Germany in English see for example H.J. Salize, H. Dreßing, 
Country report on Germany, in: Salize, Dreßing, Peitz (eds.), ‘Compulsory Admission and Involuntary 
Treatment of Mentally Ill Patients – Legislation and Practice in EU-Member States’, 2002, pp. 82 et seq, 
full text available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_projects/2000/promotion/fp_promotion_2000_frep_08_en.pdf>; 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Country thematic reports on the fundamental 
rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and persons with mental health problems, Country report 
on Germany, full text available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2142-mental-
health-study-2009-DE.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017); see also E. Habermeyer, U. Rachvoll et al., 
‘Hospitalization and Civil Commitment of Individuals with Psychopathic Disorders in Germany, Russia 
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This historically established structure is still present in German law, not least because 
legislative power, in the case of private law, is in the hands of the federal government; 
in the case of public security law it is in the hands of the federal states, the 
Bundesländer.  This concept also shines through the other continental legislation that 
will be addressed later. 
A. Constitutional Law 
In connection with deprivation of liberty in health and social care settings, the German 
system is, in contrast to other countries, not driven by the European Convention on 
Human Rights as such. Because of the crimes of the Third Reich,4 the German 
Constitution, the so-called Basic law, stated as far back as 1949 that the liberty of the 
person can be restricted only pursuant to a formal law and that only a judge can rule 
upon the permissibility of any deprivation of liberty: 
Art. 104 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.  
(1) Liberty of the person may be restricted only pursuant to a formal law and only in compliance 
with the procedures prescribed therein. … 
(2) Only a judge may rule upon the permissibility or continuation of any deprivation of liberty. If 
such a deprivation is not based on a judicial order, a judicial decision shall be obtained without 
delay. …5  
Therefore, the Basic law is still the starting point for German legislation and 
jurisprudence on deprivation of liberty.  
B. Private law 
German Private Law differentiates between “accommodation that is associated with 
deprivation of liberty” and other deprivations of liberty in institutions: 
Section 1906 German Civil Code. Approval of the custodianship court with regard to 
accommodation.  
(1) It is admissible for the custodian to put the person under custodianship in accommodation 
that is associated with deprivation of liberty only as long as this is necessary for the best interests 
of the person under custodianship because  
1. by reason of a mental illness or mental or psychological handicap of the person under 
custodianship there is a danger that he will kill himself or cause substantial damage to his 
own health, or  
2. to avert the threat of substantial damage to health, an examination of the state of health 
of the person under custodianship, therapeutic treatment or an operation is necessary, 
which cannot be carried out without the accommodation of the person under custodianship 
and the person under custodianship, by reason of a mental illness or mental or 
psychological handicap, cannot recognise the necessity of the accommodation or cannot 
act in accordance with this realisation.  
(2) The accommodation is admissible only with the approval of the custodianship court. Without 
the approval, the accommodation is admissible only if delay entails risk; the approval must 
thereafter be obtained without undue delay. … 
                                            
and the United States’, in: Felthous, Saß (eds.), The International Handbook of Psychopathic Disorders 
and the Law, Volume II, Law and Policies, 2007, pp. 36 et seq. 
4 See R. Strous, ‘Historical injustice in psychiatry with examples from Nazi Germany and others – ethical 
lessons for the modern professional’, in: Kallert, Mezzich, Monahan (eds.), Coercive Treatment in 
Psychiatry, Clinical, Legal and Ethical Aspects, 2011, pp. 161 et seq; H.R. Röttgers/P. Lepping, n. 1 
above, pp. 602 et seq. 
5 Full text in English available at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/> (last visited July 17, 
2017). 
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(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply with the necessary modifications if the person under 
custodianship who is in an institution, a home or another establishment without being 
accommodated there is to be deprived of his liberty by mechanical devices, by medical drugs or 
in another way for a long period of time or regularly. …6 
The condition for an accommodation associated with deprivation of liberty is that it is 
“necessary for the best interests of the person under custodianship”. The following 
conditions embody the principle of legal certainty:7  “by reason of a mental illness or 
mental or psychological handicap there is a danger that the person will kill himself or 
cause substantial damage to his own health”, or “to avert the threat of substantial 
damage to health, an examination of the state of health of the person under 
custodianship, therapeutic treatment or an operation is necessary, which cannot be 
carried out without the accommodation of the person under custodianship and the 
person under custodianship, by reason of a mental illness or mental or psychological 
handicap, cannot recognise the necessity of the accommodation or cannot act in 
accordance with this realisation.”8  
Conditions for other deprivations of liberty in institutions – for example through 
“mechanical devices, by medical drugs or in another way for a long period of time or 
regularly” - are the same. The definition of “long period of time” is a controversial issue 
in court decisions and legal literature. In general, it depends on the method of the 
deprivation of liberty concerned. Against this background a period of several hours or 
at least one day is considered to be “long”.9 “Regularly” means a deprivation of liberty 
                                            
6 Full text in English available at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/> (last visited July 
17, 2017). 
7 Cf. German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), 23. 3. 2011 − 2 BvR 882/09; 
German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 20.6.2012 - XII ZB 99/12 and XII ZB 130/12. 
8 For questions concerning coercive treatment see E. Flammer, T. Steinert, ‘Involuntary medication, 
seclusion, and restraint in German psychiatric hospitals after the adoption of legislation in 2013’, 
Frontiers in Psychiatry, 6:153, full text available at 
<http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpsyt.2015.00153/full>; in comparison to the Netherlands 
T. Steinert, E.O. Noorthoorn, C.L. Mulder, The use of coercive interventions in mental health care in 
Germany and the Netherlands. A comparison of the developments in two neighbouring countries’, 
Frontiers in Public Health 2:141, full text available at 
<http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00141/full>; in the light of the CRPD Staatliche 
Koordinierungsstelle, ‘Position paper by the State Coordination Agency established in accordance with 
article 33 of the CRPD’, full text available at 
<http://www.wcag2016.de/fileadmin/Mediendatenbank_WCAG/Tagungsmaterialien/Panels/Panel_08_
position_paper_Forced_hospitalization_20130718.pdf>; lately the German Federal Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared the related provisions to be partly unconstitutional, full text 
in English available at 
<http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/bvg16-059.html> 
(last visited July 17, 2017); for a comment on this decision in English see A. Ward,  A major step forward 
in CRPD compliance by the German Federal Constitutional Court?, < 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=7fdc889d-f50b-4d59-b84a-3bdb4bb75a51> (last visited 
July 17, 2017); for the ongoing reform process see <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/brd/2017/0066-
17.pdf> and most recently < http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/brd/2017/0512-17B.pdf>, only available in 
German (last visited July 17, 2017). 
9 For cases of deprivation of liberty due to the medical treatment itself Section 1904 CC applies: “Section 
1904 German Civil Code. Approval of the custodianship court in the case of medical treatment. (1) The 
consent of the custodian to an examination of the state of health of the person under custodianship, to 
therapeutic treatment or to an operation is subject to the approval of the custodianship court if the 
justified danger exists that the person under custodianship will die or will suffer serious injury to his 
health that lasts for a long period by reason of the measure. Without the approval, the measure may be 
carried out only if delay entails danger. 
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repeated at the same time of the day or for the same reason, generally irrespective of 
its duration. Nevertheless regarding a time-threshold to establish deprivation of liberty, 
jurisprudence is in a state of flux, but considers at least thirty minutes as a deprivation 
of liberty.10  
The competent authority or, figuratively speaking, (safe-)“guard” in these cases is the 
custodian who decides on the deprivation of liberty. In emergency cases, in particular 
if a custodian has not yet been appointed, the family court can take the necessary 
measures (Section 1846 CC). 
The safeguarding process requires the mandatory approval of the custodianship court. 
If delay entails risk, the approval must be obtained without undue delay. This design 
of the safeguarding process involves a huge number of cases that have to be handled 
by the courts. In 2015, custodianship courts approved more than 120,000 cases of 
deprivation of liberty under Section 1906 CC.11 
Some elements of the courts’ (safeguarding) process, as outlined in the Act on 
Proceedings in Family Matters and in Matters of Noncontentious Jurisdiction (APFNJ), 
are:12 
- the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the person concerned (Section 317 APFNJ); 
- an in-person hearing prior to the measure – to the extent necessary, in the usual environment 
of the person (Section 319 APFNJ); 
- prior to an “accommodation that is associated with deprivation of liberty”, an expert opinion on 
the necessity of the measure has to be obtained. The expert should be a psychiatrist. He or she 
shall be a physician with experience in the field of psychiatry  (Section 321 subsection 1 APFNJ). 
On the contrary for other deprivations of liberty in institutions, a medical certificate shall be 
sufficient (Section 321 subsection 2 APFNJ);  
- duration and extension of the measure are covered by special provisions (Section 329 APFNJ): 
the involuntary commitment shall cease at the latest at the end of one year; in the case of an 
obvious need for a longer period of involuntary commitment at the latest at the end of two years, 
when it was not previously extended; 
                                            
(2) The non-consent to or revocation of the consent of the custodian to a test of the state of health, 
treatment or medical intervention requires the approval of the custodianship court if the measure is 
medically indicated and there is justified reason to fear that the person under custodianship will die or 
suffer serious, long-term detriment to health if the measure is not carried out or is discontinued. 
(3) Approval pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) must be given if the consent, non-consent or revocation 
of consent corresponds to the will of the person under custodianship. 
(4) Approval pursuant to subsections (1) and (2) is not required if agreement is reached between the 
custodian and the physician in attendance that the granting, non-granting or revocation of consent 
corresponds to the will of the person under custodianship established pursuant to section 1901a. 
(5) Subsections (1) to (4) also apply to an authorised representative. The latter may only consent to, 
not consent to or revoke consent to one of the measures designated in subsection (1) sentence 1 or 
subsection (2) if the power of attorney expressly includes these measures and is given in writing.” 
10 See German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), 7.1.2015 - XII ZB 395/14. 
11 The numbers of cases of deprivation of liberty under Section 1906 subsection 4 CC currently decline; 
for statistics see  
<https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Betreuungsverfahren.h
tml> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
12 Full text in English available at <http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_famfg/> (last visited July 
17, 2017). 
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- finally, to make the measure public, special information duties apply (e.g. Section 339 APFNJ). 
There are also two fast track procedures for the safeguarding process, with exceptions 
relating to the hearing of the person concerned as well as the prior appointment of the 
guardian ad litem (Sections 331, 332 APFNJ). The interlocutory order in turn shall not 
exceed a duration of six weeks (Section 333 subsection 1 sentence 1 APFNJ). 
C. Public Security Law 
Due to the distribution of legislative power in Germany, each German federal state has 
its own law on deprivation of liberty in health and care settings – which is a total of 
sixteen different laws. Although differing considerably in some of the detail, their 
overall approach is similar. Most of the laws developed from a pure public security law 
approach focused on averting danger but evolved over time to the mental health law 
approach today.  
Therefore, deprivation of liberty in health and social care settings is also possible on 
the basis of federal state law, for example, for North Rhine-Westphalia, the Law on 
Assistance and Protective Measures in Cases of Mental Illness.13 
Conditions of deprivation of liberty in German public law do not differ much from private 
law; differences derive from the scope and perspective of the protected interests. But 
while private law (the Civil Code) refers quite generally to the principle of 
proportionality, federal state law explicitly regulates the less invasive measures, 
including community care by multi-disciplinary teams or social psychiatric services. 
Furthermore, and different from private law, the execution of the deprivation of liberty 
is regulated more elaborately. 
The competent authority or “guard” in these cases is the judge, while in emergency 
situations it is the local administrative authority, particularly the local health authority. 
Today the courts’ safeguarding procedure is regulated by almost the same provisions 
as those enshrined in private law (see Section 312 no. 3 APFNJ). Furthermore, this 
safeguarding process is supported by additional information duties and administrative 
commissions visiting and supervising the institutions regularly. 
D. Practice 
For a long time there was a competence conflict between deprivation of liberty on the 
grounds of private law and public security law. In practice, the easiest way was often 
used. Today the safeguarding provisions are nearly the same, although fast track 
procedures are still a problem. However, because the competent person often remains 
the same and only the procedure changes, there is little motivation to use the fast track 
procedure as the work reverts to the same desk afterwards.   
Today, discussions in this field are centred on the qualification of each person involved 
in the safeguarding process. There are also special research projects focusing in 
                                            
13 For other examples see E. Habermeyer, U. Rachvoll et al., n. 3 above, pp. 37 et seq. 
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particular on the avoidance of restrictions of liberty and on awareness raising for less 
interfering alternatives.14 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is also an issue in 
Germany, but the focus lies on its practical rather than on its legislative 
implementation.15 
II. SWITZERLAND 
The last amendment of the Swiss provisions concerning deprivation of liberty was in  
2013, when the so-called “centennial reform” of the law of protection of adults came 
into force.16 While there is still an overlap of the regulations on deprivation of liberty in 
private and public law in Germany, in Switzerland there is today a clearer distinction 
between deprivation of liberty on the grounds of private law in the person’s own 
interest, and deprivation of liberty through public security law in the interest of others. 
A. ECHR 
In contrast to the German system, the Swiss system is driven by the European 
Convention on Human Rights, not least because the Swiss Federal Supreme Court is 
not allowed to examine Swiss Federal Law, that is the law of the Federation itself.17 A 
constitutional court in the proper sense does not exist.18 This is why judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights on Swiss Federal Law have a special impact on 
Swiss Legislation.19 
B. Care-Related Hospitalisation  
Swiss private law allows for the commitment to an appropriate institution. The 
conditions of hospitalisation are, in this case, that the person suffers from a mental 
disorder, or mental disability, or serious neglect and the required treatment or care 
cannot be provided otherwise: 
 
                                            
14 See examples on the projects “ReduFix” and “Werdenfelser Weg” in the Statement of the German 
Federal Government regarding the three concluding observations made in paragraph 20, which were 
adopted in the framework of the presentation of the sixth periodic report of Germany (CCPR/C/DEU/6) 
by the Human Rights Committee on 30 and 31 October 2012 (2944th and 2945th meetings), pp. 6 et 
seq, full text in English available at <http://www.institut-fuer-
menschenrechte.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF-
Dateien/Pakte_Konventionen/ICCPR/iccpr_state_report_germany_6_2010_cobs__2012_Follow_up_
2013_BR_en.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017); for the declining numbers of cases of deprivation of liberty 
under Section 1906 subsection 4 CC, see n. 11 above. 
15 See E. Flammer, T. Steinert, n. 8 above, pp. 1 seq.; with a focus on Art. 12 CRPD; V. Lipp, 
‘Guardianship and Autonomy: Foes or Friends?‘, in: Arai, Becker, Lipp (eds.), Adult Guardianship Law 
for the 21st Century, Proceedings of the First World Congress on Adult Guardianship Law 2010, 2013, 
pp. 103 et seq. 
16 See on this topic I. Schwenzer/T. Keller, ‘A new law for the protection of adults’, The International 
Survey of Family Law, 2013, pp. 375 et seq.  
17 See Art. 190 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation: “The Federal Supreme Court and the 
other judicial authorities apply the federal acts and international law”; full text in English available at < 
https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html> (last visited July 17, 2017).  
18 On this topic T. Fleiner/A. Misic/N. Töpperwien, Constitutional Law in Switzerland, 2012, N. 663 et 
seq. 
19 See on this point T. Fleiner/A. Misic/N. Töpperwien, n. 18 above, N. 665. 
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Art. 426 Swiss Civil Code [Hospitalisation for treatment or care].  
(1) A person suffering from a mental disorder or mental disability or serious neglect (the patient) 
may be committed to an appropriate institution if the required treatment or care cannot be 
provided otherwise.  
(2) The burden that the patient places on family members and third parties and their protection 
must be taken into account. …20 
1.  Adult protection authority 
The competent authority or “guard” for care-related hospitalisation is generally the 
adult protection authority (Art. 428 para. 1 CC), but the detailed implementation of this 
competence set out under Swiss Federal Law is up to the Swiss cantons. As a 
consequence, the competent authority differs from canton to canton and is either an 
administrative authority or, especially in the French speaking cantons, a court.21  
The procedure reflects some of the commonly known safeguards. If necessary, the 
adult protection authority shall order that the person is represented and appoint a 
person experienced in care-related and legal matters as his or her deputy (Art. 449a 
CC). The person shall be heard in person unless to do so appears inappropriate (Art. 
447 para. 1 CC). If necessary, the adult protection authority shall commission an 
opinion from an expert (Art. 446 para. 3 CC). A review shall be conducted at the latest 
six months after hospitalisation, and a second review within the following six months; 
thereafter as often as necessary, but at least once every year (Art. 431 CC).  
In addition, any person committed to an institution may appoint a person whom he or 
she trusts as a representative to support him or her during his stay and until the 
conclusion of all related procedures (Art. 432 CC). 
2.  Doctors 
Furthermore, the cantons may designate doctors as “guards” who, in addition to the 
adult protection authority, are authorised to order hospitalisation for a period specified 
by cantonal law, but not exceeding six weeks. Beyond the specified period, 
hospitalisation may not continue unless a hospitalisation order from the adult 
protection authority applies (Art. 430 CC). 
The doctor shall examine and interview in person. If possible, he or she shall notify a 
person closely related to the patient in writing on his or her committal and on the rights 
of appeal (Art. 431 CC). 
C. Restriction of freedom of movement in Residential or Care Institutions 
Inspired by German law, special provisions concerning the restriction of freedom of 
movement in Residential or Care Institutions have existed since 2013:22 
Art. 383 Swiss Civil Code [Restriction of freedom of movement].  
(1) The residential or nursing institution may restrict the freedom of movement of the person 
lacking capacity of judgement only if less stringent measures are clearly insufficient or prove to 
be so and the measure serves to:  
1. prevent serious danger to the life or physical integrity of the client or third parties; or  
                                            
20 Full text in English available at <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19070042/index.html> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
21 See in general I. Schwenzer/T. Keller, n. 16 above, pp. 384 et seq. 
22 See in general I. Schwenzer/T. Keller, n. 16 above, p. 381. 
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2. remedy serious disruption to life in and around the institution. …23 
The competent authority or “guard” in this case is the residential or nursing institution 
itself. 
Conditions for the restriction of the freedom of movement are that the person lacks the 
capacity of judgement and that the restriction serves the prevention of serious danger 
to the life or physical integrity of the person or third parties or remedies serious 
disruption to life in and around the institution. The other condition set out by Art. 383 
para. 1 CC, that less stringent measures are clearly insufficient or prove to be so, is a 
mere declaration of the general principle of proportionality. This declaration was 
considered important as guidance for those involved in practice.  
The safeguarding procedure is generally limited to information and documentation 
duties. Before the person’s freedom of movement is restricted, it shall be explained to 
the person concerned what is happening, why the measure has been ordered, how 
long it is expected to last and who will be responsible for the person concerned during 
this period (Art. 383 para. 2 CC). Furthermore, a record shall be kept of any measure 
restricting freedom of movement and the representative in relation to medical 
procedures shall be notified (Art. 384 para. 1, 2 CC). 
The person concerned or a closely related person may submit a written request at any 
time for the adult protection authority to intervene. In addition, each canton shall make 
the residential and care institution subject to supervision (Art. 387 CC). 
D. Practice 
Being driven by the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, the Swiss 
legislator always remains one step behind. There are exceptions, especially in the 
canton of Ticino but, generally, a strong paternalistic tendency is dominant within 
Switzerland.  
Critical points of the new system seem to become the authorisation for “doctors” to 
order hospitalisation, accompanied by an unsatisfactory safeguarding procedure – 
and the fact that the appointment of a representative during the person’s stay is only 
optional. 
III. FRANCE 
In contrast to Germany and Switzerland and due to a different legislative competence 
structure, France brought together the traditional strings of provisions concerning 
deprivation of liberty into one act. These are implemented today in the French Public 
Health Code (PHC) and were last refined in 2013.24   
                                            
23 Full text in English available at <https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19070042/index.html> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
24 For (partially outdated) country reports on France in English see for example C. Jonas, A. Machu, V. 
Kovess, Country report on France, in: Salize, Dreßing, Peitz (eds.), n. 3 above, pp. 75 et seq.; FRA, n. 
3 above, Country report on France, full text available at 
<http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2149-mental-health-study-2009-FR.pdf> (last 
visited July 17, 2017). 
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A. Hospitalisation 
The PHC distinguishes between two types of involuntary hospitalisation: a compulsory 
hospitalisation at the request of a third party to protect the person’s interests (Art. 
L3212-1 et seq PHC), and a compulsory hospitalisation by official order, to avert 
danger in the interests of others or the public (Art. L3213-1 et seq PHC). Both methods 
of hospitalisation are introduced under different conditions.  
1.  Compulsory hospitalisation at the request of a third party 
Compulsory hospitalisation at the request of a third party requires that the person’s 
mental state needs immediate care and constant supervision in a hospital setting (full-
hospitalisation) or, introduced by a reform in 2011, “other regular medical 
supervisions” within the framework of an individual care plan, for example out-patient 
or part-time care. A mental disorder has to make the person’s consent impossible (Art. 
3212-1 para. 1 PHC). 
The first step in safeguarding these conditions is their further differentiation, on the 
one hand by emphasising the person’s rights, especially his or her right to information 
and, on the other hand by highlighting the decision guiding principles, in particular the 
principle of proportionality. 
The competent authority or the “guard” who is mandated to decide on the deprivation 
of liberty is the director of the hospital. 
To safeguard the conditions set out by the provisions concerned here, in other words 
the “interest” of the person, there has to be an application for the deprivation of liberty 
by a so-called “third party”. This could be, for example, due to the important role of the 
family in French legislation, a family member or another close person who is able to 
act in his or her interest. The application by a third party can be omitted if imminent 
danger to the person’s health has been established by a doctor. Nevertheless, the 
director of the hospital has to inform the family or other representatives of the person. 
Furthermore, two recent medical certificates verifying the fulfilment of the conditions 
set out by the legal basis are required. In emergency situations one certificate is 
sufficient. 
Today, the admission is followed by an observation period. In the first twenty-four 
hours, a psychiatrist must issue a medical certificate, confirming or rejecting the need 
for hospitalisation. Another examination has to take place within seventy-two hours 
following admission, concluded by a decision on future hospitalisation or medical 
surveillance. The director can order continued hospitalisation for up to one month, 
eventually followed by monthly renewals, always based on a medical certificate.  If the 
duration exceeds one year, each year a committee of three members of the institution 
has to examine the state of health of the person concerned.  
Apart from these administrative safeguards, a decision of the French Constitutional 
Council in 2010,25 invoking Art. 66 of the Constitution and its requirement that any 
                                            
25 French Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel), Decision no. 2010-71 QPC, 26.11.2010, full 
text in French available at <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2010/201071qpc.htm> (last visited 
July 17, 2017). 
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deprivation of freedom has to be subject to the control of the judicial authority,26 forced 
the French legislator to include a new element in this safeguarding process: full 
hospitalisation can only be continued if it is permitted by the liberty and custody judge 
within the first twelve days of hospitalisation. Another decision upon admission has to 
take place within the next six months. 
2.  Compulsory hospitalisation by official order 
Compulsory hospitalisation by official order requires that a “mental disorder requires 
treatment” and “jeopardises the safety of others or seriously threatens public order” 
(Article L3213-1 para. 1 PHC). 
The competent authority, or the “guard” in this case, is the local Prefect, in other words 
the State's representative. 
The Prefect’s decision on the admission is based on a medical certificate. In the case 
of imminent danger, confirmed by a medical certificate, it is the mayor (or in Paris the 
police commissioner) who can decide on provisional placement measures, but he or 
she has to inform the Prefect within twenty-four hours.  
The observation period after admission is the same as in the case of compulsory 
hospitalisation at the request of a third party. Based on the final report, the Prefect 
decides on future care and hospitalisation. 
3.  Information duties 
In addition to this safeguarding process there is another layer of safeguarding. The 
admission process is accompanied by different information duties, informing different 
administrative and judicial authorities. One example are the County Commissions for 
Psychiatric Hospitalisations (Commissions départementales des hospitalisations 
psychiatriques), which are entitled to supervise and, in special cases, to visit the 
establishment, to assess the person’s situation and apply to the judge for the 
termination of the measures taken. Nevertheless, in practice, they are often 
considered to be too reserved and there are doubts concerning their independence, 
as it is the Prefect who appoints most of the members of the commission.27  
B. Other Limitations 
Besides these provisions, in France there is no explicit regulation of deprivation or 
limitation of liberty in a health and social care context. In particular, concerning the 
limitation of liberty by bedrails or wheelchair straps in nursing homes for example, in 
France there only exist codes of best practice as “safeguards” – supported by 
administrative and judicial authorities supervising the establishments.28 The legal 
basis for such deprivation of liberty shall determine the establishment’s own regulation 
                                            
26 Full text of the Constitution of October 4, 1958 in English available at <http://www2.assemblee-
nationale.fr/langues/welcome-to-the-english-website-of-the-french-national-assembly> (last visited 
July 17, 2017). 
27 See FRA, n. 24 above, N. 47. 
28 For a critique see Contrôleur general des lieux de privation de liberté, ‘Isolation and restraint in mental 
health institutions‘, full text in English available at http://www.cglpl.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2012/12/CGLPL_Report_Isolation-and-restraint-in-mental-health-institutions.pdf (last 
visited July 17, 2017). 
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or the contract with the person concerned, each of which is more clearly specified in 
the so-called patient’s handbook.29 
C. Practice 
In French legislation, the role of the judge becomes more and more important, in the 
light of constitutional provisions enforced by the French Constitutional Council. 
Nevertheless, it remains an administration-based system.  
After several amendments,30 especially to close some backdoors provided by fast 
track procedures, the exception of “imminent danger” to the common procedure of 
compulsory hospitalisation at the request of a third party seems to become the new 
Achilles heel of the French system. Significant regional differences in the application 
of this exception are already ascertainable. However, the French system’s main 
problem today seems to be the emphasis on security aspects, accompanied by the 
recent expansion of high-security units in French public psychiatric hospitals for 
patients with dangerous behaviour. This threatens to tip the scales to the disadvantage 
of the person concerned.31  
IV. AUSTRIA 
In Austria the right to liberty and security is laid down in the Federal Constitutional Law 
on the Protection of Personal Liberty.32 In 1990, last amended in 2010, an Act on 
Compulsory Admission of Mentally Ill Persons (Hospitalization Act, HA) was enacted 
and, in addition, in 2005, an Act on the Protection of the Personal Freedom of 
Residents of Homes and other Nursing and Care Facilities was enacted.33   
 
 
                                            
29 For recommendations and proposals concerning the patient’s handbook see in French <http://social-
sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Elaborer_et_diffuser_le_livret_d_accueil_des_personnes_hospitalisees_-
_recommendations_et_propositions-2.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
30 See on their impact for example M. Coldefy, T. Tartour, C. Nestrigue, ‘From Compulsory Psychiatric 
Hospitalisation to Compulsory Treatment: First Results Following the Institution of the Law of July 5th 
2011’, Questions d’économie de la Santé, no. 205 (2015), full text in English available at 
<http://www.irdes.fr/english/issues-in-health-economics/205-from-compulsory-psychiatric-
hospitalisation-to-compulsory-treatment.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
31 See for example French Contrôleur general des lieux de privation de liberté, Opinion of 17th January 
2013 concerning unjustified stays in Units for Difficult Psychiatric Patients (UMD), full text in English 
available at <http://www.cglpl.fr/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/AVIS_UMD_20130124_EN.pdf> (last 
visited July 17, 2017); see also L. Velpry, B. Eyraud, ‘Confinement and Psychiatric Care: A Comparison 
Between High-Security Units for Prisoners and for Difficult Patients in France’, Culture, Medicine and 
Psychiatry (2014) 38, pp. 550 et seq.; A.M. Lovell, L.A. Rhodes, ‘Psychiatry with Teeth: Notes on 
Coercion and Control in France and the United States’, Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry (2014) 38, pp. 
618 et seq. 
32 Full text available at 
<https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Erv/ERV_1988_684/ERV_1988_684.pdf> (last visited July 17, 
2017).  
33 For (partially outdated) country reports on Austria in English see for example P. König, Country report 
on Austria, in: Salize, Dreßing, Peitz (eds.), n. 3 above, pp. 75 et seq; FRA, n. 3 above, Country report 
on Austria, full text available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2137-mental-health-
study-2009-AT.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
80 
 
A.  Compulsory Admission Act 
The Act on the Hospitalization of Mentally Ill Persons allows for an involuntary 
placement and deprivation of personal freedom in a psychiatric institution.34  
The involuntary placement requires that there is reason to assume that due to the 
person’s mental “illness” his or her life or health, or the life or health of others, is 
seriously and severely at risk and there is no other appropriate possibility of medical 
treatment or care. 
The competent “guard” is the head of the psychiatric institution. In general, only a 
physician in the public health service or a police physician can decide or order that a 
person is brought to a psychiatric institution. In hospital, the head of department has 
to conduct a medical inspection to inform the person concerned and to notify the 
person’s relatives as well as the judge. 
The court has to gain a personal impression of the person, inform him or her about the 
proceedings and hear him or her within four days. If the court deems a placement 
justified, it must hold oral proceedings within fourteen days. 
One of the main Austrian safeguards is the ex lege representation of the person by a 
so-called Patient Advocate. Patient Advocates represent the person during the whole 
process and duration of the hospitalisation and are meant to mobilise the person’s 
individual rights. 
B. Act on the Protection of Personal Freedom of Home Residents 
The Act on the Protection of the Personal Freedom of Residents of Homes and other 
Nursing and Care was last amended in 2010. It regulates the conditions of restrictions 
of the resident’s freedom by, for example, bed rails, wheelchair straps, trick locks, 
etc.35 
Conditions of the restrictions are the mental illness or mental disability of the resident 
and that, due to this, his or her life or health, or the life or health of others, is seriously 
and severely at risk. Furthermore, it is a requirement that there is no other appropriate 
way of avoiding this risk. 
The competent “guard” is, in the case of medical restraints, a doctor; in the case of 
care related restraints, a specially trained person appointed by the establishment; and 
in institutions caring for mentally handicapped persons, the person in charge of the 
institution. 
In addition to the resident’s right to appoint a representative to assert his or her right 
to personal freedom, he or she is ex lege represented by so-called resident 
representatives, who are entitled to visit the establishment to get a personal 
impression of the resident, to inspect relevant documents and to discuss the measures 
with the competent “guard”. Like the resident himself or herself and the head of the 
                                            
34 See also A. Leischner, C. Zeinhofer, C. Lindner, C. Kopetzki, Medical Law in Austria, 2nd edition, 
2014, N. 293 et seq. 
35 See also A. Leischner, C. Zeinhofer, C. Lindner, C. Kopetzki, n. 34 above, N. 299 et seq. 
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department, the representative is entitled to request the court to review the restriction 
of liberty measure. 
C. Practice 
In practice, there is a broad awareness of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. And, different from other countries, the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment is 
considered even in Austrian case-law.  
Nevertheless, there are, other than in Austrian guardianship law, no plans to amend 
legislation. Efforts are made more towards the optimisation of the existing 
safeguarding system. Its driving force today are the Patient Advocates. These flood 
the courts with complaints, particularly following amendments to legislation in 2010. 
This is a seriously costly “problem” of the Austrian System today but there are not yet 
any reform plans. 
V. SPAIN 
In the case of Spain, the most recent reform of deprivation of liberty safeguards 
happened in July 2015.36 Differing from France and Austria, the regulation is 
systematically rooted in private (procedural) law. Special provisions concerning the 
restriction of liberty do not generally exist.  
Article 763. Non-voluntary hospitalisation due to mental disorders.  
1. The hospitalisation of a person due to mental disorders who is not in a condition to decide for 
himself/herself, even should he/she be subject to parental authority or guardianship, shall require 
court authorisation, which shall be obtained from the court of the place of residence of the person 
affected by such hospitalisation.  
Authorisation shall be obtained prior to hospitalisation, unless reasons of urgency should make 
it necessary to adopt the measure immediately. In such case, the manager of the centre at which 
patient was admitted shall give the competent court notice thereof as soon as possible and, in 
any event, within twenty-four hours, so that the court may proceed to ratify the measure, which 
must take place within no more than seventy-two hours from the time the court was made aware 
of the hospitalisation. … 
3. Prior to granting authorisation for or ratifying a hospitalisation that has already taken place, the 
court shall hear the person affected by such decision, the Public Prosecution Service and any 
another person whose appearance it may deem appropriate or may be requested by the person 
affected by the measure. Furthermore, the court shall examine the person hospitalised and hear 
the opinion of the physician in whose care he/she has been entrusted, notwithstanding taking 
any other evidence it may deem relevant for the case. In all such procedures, the person affected 
by the hospitalisation measure shall be entitled to representation and defence … 37 
Spanish law allows for the hospitalisation of a person who has a mental disorder and 
who is not in a condition to decide for himself or herself. The interests protected are 
                                            
36 For (partially outdated) country reports on Spain in English see for example F. Torres-Gonzalez, 
Country report on Spain, in: Salize, Dreßing, Peitz (eds.), n. 3 above, pp. 131 ff.; FRA, n. 3 above, 
Country report on Spain, full text available at <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/2146-
mental-health-study-2009-ES.pdf> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
37 Full text in English available at <http://www.mjusticia.gob.es/cs/Satellite/Portal/es/servicios-
ciudadano/documentacion-publicaciones/publicaciones/traducciones-derecho-espanol> (last visited 
July 17, 2017). 
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not closely defined and even Spanish decisions authorising deprivation of liberty show 
a mixture of different arguments relating to private and public interests. 
In general, the competent “guard" is the judge. Authorisation shall be obtained prior to 
hospitalisation, unless reasons of urgency make it necessary to adopt the measure 
immediately. In such cases, the manager of the centre at which the patient was 
admitted shall give the competent court notice thereof as soon as possible and, in any 
event, within twenty-four hours. This fast-track procedure is used, for example, in the 
province of Madrid in about 99% of the cases. 
In addition, there are the commonly known safeguards, including a hearing of the 
person affected, their examination and the appointment of a representative. However, 
this is only the starting point. Recently the constitutional court took a closer look at 
these provisions. It strengthened the legal provisions with additional court-directed 
safeguarding processes, including, for example, the requirement for a certain number 
of medical certificates.38 
In addition, the Spanish constitutional court judged the provisions concerning 
deprivation of liberty unconstitutional because of mistakes in the legislation process. 
As a consequence, the way was cleared for a fundamental revision. There was no 
shortage of reform proposals as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities is foremost in today’s discussions.39  
The Spanish parliament adopted new provisions in July 2015.40 The formal legislation 
process doesn’t seem to pose an obstacle this time. The only drawback is that the 
new provisions are identical to the old ones.41 
VI. SUMMARY 
Taking an overview of the legislation in this sample of countries regarding the 
deprivation of liberty in mental and social care settings, there is a trend to distinguish 
between provisions concerning deprivation of liberty by “hospitalisation” and other 
deprivations or restrictions of liberty. Although jurisprudence and legal literature 
struggle to delineate deprivation of liberty by hospitalisation from other deprivations or 
restrictions of liberty, both seem to represent fundamentally different categories. While 
the starting point, deprivation of liberty, is the same – and conditions therefore are at 
least similar – it is the safeguarding process that marks their differences.  
In particular, there is a trend to emphasise the role of the judge, or at least an 
independent person, but there is no consensus as to whether the judge should play a 
role in the admission or control process. Each national legislation tries to reconcile its 
problems with special fast track procedures or explicit deadlines for the decision of the 
court. The judge does not replace the medical experts, but is considered a neutral, 
                                            
38 Spanish Constitutional Court, Sentencia 141/2012, full text available in Spanish at < 
http://hj.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/Resolucion/Show/22988> (last visited July 17, 2017). 
39 For example, in Spanish, J. Pallarés Neila, ‘Podrias decirme, por favour, qué camino he de tomar 
para salir de aquí’, Rev. Asoc. Esp. Neuropsiq., 2014; 34 (121), pp. 115 et seq; L.F. Barrios Flores, ‘La 
regulación del internamiento psiquiátrico involuntario en España: carencias jurídicas históricas y 
actuales‘, Derecho y Salud 22 (2012) I, pp. 31 et seq. 
40 See Organic Law (Ley Orgánica) 8/2015, 22.7.2015. 
41 See n. 40 above. 
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independent expert in supervising the decision making process. Amongst others this 
supervision leads in practice to a higher quality of medical expert opinion. However, 
after having safeguarded even the safeguards, the importance of proper, continuous 
training of each person involved in the process is still frequently pointed out. 
Nevertheless, the impression remains that this personal aspect and its impact on each 
individual case hides the fact that the continental European systems themselves are 
based on a historically founded, objective or sometimes still paternalistic perspective 
on deprivation of liberty. There might be differences between the national legislations, 
for example in their use of private or public law mechanisms, regarding the 
appointment of a representative for the person concerned, or even on the amount of 
information which the person must receive. But from the today’s individual perspective 
on deprivation of liberty such systems necessarily remain patchwork, taking the wrong 
starting point.42  
What does it mean if mental disorder eventually falls away as a condition for 
deprivation of liberty? The “danger” criteria could take centre-stage – with all its known 
disadvantages.43 It might be a step forward to break down the “danger” criterion into 
its elements: into a situation that will result with sufficient probability in damage to one 
of the interests protected by law, while the notion of “interest” could serve as a link to 
future developments in other questions concerning self-determination, as in 
guardianship or contract law. At the end of the day both concepts might not produce 
large differences in theory but today’s practice shows, that at least the above 
presented European systems are not able to control the centrifugal forces they have 
released. 
 
 
                                            
42 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Guidelines on Article 14 of the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: The Right to Liberty and Security of Persons with Disabilities, 
September 2015, paras. 6 et seq < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRPD/GC/GuidelinesArticle14.doc> (last visited July 17, 
2017). 
43 For the notion of “dangerousness” see P. Bartlett and R. Sandland, Mental Health Law: Policy and 
Practice, 4th edition, 2014, pp. 239 seqq. 
